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MIAMI LAW QUARTERLY
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW-FREEDOM OF SPEECH-
USE OF LOUDSPEAKERS
I)efendant was convicted for operating a sound truck in violation of a
municipal ordinance,' and appealed alleging that the ordinance violated the
Fourteenth Amendment to the Federal Constitution. The New Jersey Supreme
Court, by a split decision, upheld the validity of the ordinance? This decision
was affirmed by an evenly divided Court of Errors and Appeals.3 From this
decision the defendant appealed to the United States Supreme Court. Held,
conviction affirmed. The ordinance did not violate the Fourteenth Amendment,
as it was not in contravention of the rights of freedom of speech, freedom of
assemblage, or freedom to communicate infornatiot to others. Kovacs v.
Cooper, 69 Silp. Ct. 448 (1949) (four Justices dissenting), rehearing denied,
69 Sup. Ct. 638 (1949).
The problei of amplified speech devolves into the basic conflict between
the constitutional right of the individual to free expression of opinion and ideas
and the right of privacy of the general public, which is protected by the state
police power.' Civil rights are not absolute, and can be reasonablh restricted. 5
However, the recent trend has been to place them in a favored position to
insure against a breach in our democratic tradition.6
The right of a state reasonably to regulate noise through its police power
is undisptited: but completely to abridge a constitutional right in the guise
of regulation is repugnant to our theory of civil liherties.8
The instant case can best be evaluated by considering it together with
1. Ordinance No. 430, City of Trenton, New Jersey:
"4, That it shall be unlawful for any person, firm or corporation, either as principal, agent
or employee, to play, use or operate for advertising purposes, or for any other purpose
whatsoever, on or upon the public streets, alleys or thoroughfares in the City of Trenton,
any device known as a sound truck, loud speaker or sound amplifier, or radio or phono-
graph with a loud speaker or sound amplifier, or any other instrument known as a calliope
or any instrument of any kind or character which emits therefrom loud and raucous
noises and is attached to and upon any vehicle operated or standing upon said streets or
public places aforementioned."
2. Kovacs v. Cooper, 135 N. J. L. 64, 50 A.2d 451 (1946).
3. Kovacs v. Cooper, 135 N. J. L. 584, 52 A.2d 806 (1947).
4. E.g., Queenside Hills Realty Co. v. Saxl, 328 U.S. 80 (1946) ; Cox v. New Flamp-
shire, 312 U.S. 569 (1941) Schneider v. State, 308 U.S. 147 (1939) ; Nebbia v. New
York, 291 U.S. 502 (1933) ; Chicago, B. & Q. Ry. v. Drainage Comm'rs, 200 U.S. 561(1906).
5. E.g., Prince v. Massachusetts, 321 U.S. 158 (1944) ; Murdock v. Pennsylvania,
319 U.S. 105 (1943) ; Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568 (1942) ; Cox v. New
Hampshire, supra; Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296 (1940) ; Gitlow v. New York,
268 U.S. 652 (1925) ; Sebenck v. United States, 249 U.S. 47 (1919).
6. E.g., Marsh v. Alabama, 326 U.S. 501 (1946) ; Prince v. Massachusetts, supra;
Follett v. McCormick, 321 U.S. 573 (1944) ; Murdock v. Pennsylvania, supra; American
Federation of Labor v. Swing, 312 U.S. 321 (1941) ; Cantwell v. Connecticut, supra.
7. Hamilton v. City of Montrose, 109 Colo. 228, 124 P.2d 757 (1942) (city ordinance
regulating sound devices upheld) ; Manpin v. City of Louisville, 284 Ky. 195, 144 S. W.2d
237 (1940) ; Brachey v. Maupin, 277 Ky. 467, 126 S. W.2d 881 (1939).
8. Cantwell v. Connecticut. suipra; Hague v. C. 1. 0., 307 U.S. 496 (1939) ; Lovell v.
Griffin, 303 U.S. 444 (1938).
CASES NOTED
the recent case of Saia v. People of New York.9 In the Saia case a city ordi-
nance required any person desiring to use a loud speaker in a public place
to obtain prior permission from the chief of police. As the ordinance failed to
set an adequate standard for the exercise of judgment by the chief of police,
the Supreme Court, in a five to four decision, held that it was a previous
restraint on the right of free speech and, therefore, unconstitutional. The
Court in that case recognized an extension of the right of free speech-the
right to amplify one's voice.' 0 If the right is a constitutional one, it cannot be
legislated out of existence by the use of the police power of the states.1 ' The
instant case again opens this issue-is there a constitutional right to be heard
through the use of a loudspeaker? The nicety of the question is apparent from
the fact that there are three concurring opinions and two written dissenting
opinions. However, there are only three basic views.
The first view 12 indicates that there is no constitutional right to mnechani-
cally amplified free speech, as the constitutional guarantees apply only to the
natural voice. In an attempt to justify this attitude the rather outmoded argu-
ment is advanced that since the framers of the Constitution could not have
known of modern mechanical devices, such guarantees should not apply to
them. This reasoning was long ago repudiated as to interstate commerce, 3
and the federal taxing power. 14
The second view extends the privilege of free speech to include amplified
speech, subject only to narrow limitations. The Justices taking this view
seem quite concerned with the practical effect of holding ordinances of this
type to be constitutional. The primary objection is that to so hold is to deprive
the individual of what could conceivably be the only effective or plausible
means to reach an audience. 15
The third view 16 attempts to take the middle road between the two
extremes. The Justices advocating this view prevailed. Not wishing to repu-
diate the Saia case, they attempted to distinguish it on the basis of the differ-
ence in the wording of the two ordinances. Recognizing the constitutional
right of free speech through amplification, the Court found that this right was
not violated. Although the ordinance could well be construed as entirely
prohibiting all sound irucks, 17" the Court chose to interpret the ordinance as
9. 334 U.S. 558 (1948).
10. The development of this concept is traced in 3 MIAM L. Q. 51 (1948).
11. See note 5 supra.
12. Kovacs v. Cooper, supra at 454.
13. In re Debs, 158 U.S. 564 (1895).
14. South Carolina v. United States, 199 U.S. 437 (1905) (see also Mr. Justice Rut-
ledge, dissenting in the principal case).
15. Kovacs v. Cooper, supra at 459 (dissenting opinion).
16. Kovacs v. Cooper, supra at 449.
17. The ordinance was construed by the New Jersey Supreme Court prohibiting the
use of sound trucks. See note 2 supra.
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forbidding only loud and raucous sound trucks and that these words conveyed
a sufficiently accurate concept of what was forbidden.
More than half of the Justices feel that the decision ili the Saia case has
been repudiated, despite the desire by the majority not to do so. The practical
effect of this decision is to indicate that only a municipal ordinanlce expressly
and unequivocally forbidding an%' amplification of speech whatsoever, would
be held invalid; but any words creating an ambiguity would remove the ordi-
nance from that category.
The more liberal thought evinced in the Saia case appears preferable.
The decision is not consonant with the modern trend toward expansion of civil
liberties. Fear of the possible abuse of a right is no excuse for its abrogation
or unreasonable abridgment.
LABOR LAW-PICKETING-LEGALITY OF OBJECT-
SELECTIVE HIRING OF NEGROES
'etitioners, as individuals and not as members of a labor union, requested
the "Lucky Stores" to engage in selective hiring of Negro clerks based on the
proportion of white and Negro customers who patronized the stores. The
requested hiring was to be made, as clerical vacancies became available,
through the Retail Clerks Union, with whom the stores had a union shop
contract. Upon refusal of their demands, the petitioners peaceably picketed
one of the stores with signs announcing, "Don't Patronize-Lucky Won't
Hire Negro Clerks In Proportion To Negro Trade." The store secured an
injunction against the pickets which the latter ignored. Adjudged guilty of
contempt, petitioners brought a writ of certiorari to annul the conviction.; Held,
conviction affirmed. Such picketing is for the unlawful object of establishing
an arbitrary and discriminatory hiring policy on a racial basis, thereby effecting
the equivalent of both a closed shop and a closed union in favor of the Negro
race. Hughes v. Superior Court in and for Contra Costa County, 198 P.2d 885
(Cal. 1948).
It is well established that peaceful picketing is guaranteed as an incident
of free speech by the First and Fourteenth Amendments to the Federal Consti-
tution,' though many authors and judges have assailed picketing as extending
beyond mere free speech and as a weapon of coercion and intimidation.2
Peaceftl picketing is not permissive, however, if directed toward an unlawful
1. Thornhill v. Alabama, 310 U.S. 88 (1940); Carlson v. California, 310 U.S. 106
(1940) ; Sen v. Tile Layers Protective Union, 301 U.S. 468 (1937).
2. 'ee McKay v. Retail Automobile Salesmens' Local Union, 16 Cal.2d 311, 106
P.2d 373, 395 (1940) (dissenting opinion) I TFaLIE, LABOR DisetuEs AND COLLECTIVE
IARGAINI-4G § 136 (1940).
